Showing posts with label Korean War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korean War. Show all posts
Saturday, 6 September 2008
Monday, 29 October 2007
A gift of MiG 15 to USAF
http://lankov.oriental.ru/d110.shtml
This first flight occurred soon after the conclusion of truce, on 21 September, 1953, when the Lieutenant OF VVS OF PDRK - PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA but Kym- juice ran to Seoul on his MiG-15. For the American reconnaissance his appearance became the present gift: mikoyanovskiy MIG-15 was then one of the best destroyers of peace, and for the first time this machine it fell into the hands of the American specialists of that not injured. Itself but Kym- juice obtained 100.000 dollars (astronomical sum, taking into account inflation equivalent to several of present million dollars) and American citizenships. It it used, having immediately moved in THE USA to the residence. In the course of time but the Kym- juice became noticeable aeronautical engineer, it taught at the university, now it left to the pension.
Saturday, 27 October 2007
Wednesday, 17 October 2007
MiG vs Sabre Which is better
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p86_11.html
Which was the better fighter, the Sabre or the MiG? As in most questions of this type, the answer is--it depends!
Throughout the Korean war, American intelligence on the capabilities of the MiG-15 was limited largely to Sabre pilots' fleeting impressions of the Russian-built aircraft when they encountered it in combat. These impressions were reinforced by a description of a MiG-15 flown to Denmark in March of 1953 by a Polish defector, and also by the examination of a wrecked MiG salvaged from 17 feet of water off the North Korean coast in July of 1951.
On September 21, 1953, Lt. No Kum-Suk of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Corps defected to the South along with his MiG-15bis. This presented the USAF with its first flyable example of its MiG-15 opponent, and gave US intelligence the first chance to compare its initial impressions with actual flight test data. The MiG was dismantled and flown to Okinawa aboard a C-124 Globemaster. There, it was reassembled and flown by a crew of experienced test pilots including Maj. Gen. Albert B. Boyd, Major Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager, and Capt H. E. Collins. The MiG was painted with USAF markings, and was assigned the fictitious serial number "616", because Capt. Collins had used this same number on a plane he had once flown. The actual MiG serial number was 2015357. This aircraft was later flown to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. Lt. No's MiG-15bis is currently on display at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base Museum, painted in its original North Korean markings. The test flights confirmed the initial impressions of combat pilots in Korea. The MiG-15 was faster than the F-86A and F-86E at altitudes above 30,000 feet, but slower at lower altitudes. Early F-86Fs were superior in speed to the MiG only up to 35,000 feet, whereas the "6-3" F-86Fs were faster than their MiG opponents all the way up to the Sabre's service ceiling.
One of the primary advantages of the MiG over the Sabre was its 4000-foot advantage in service ceiling. It would often happen that F-86s would enter MiG Alley at 40,000 feet, only to find MiGs circling 10,000 feet above them. There was nothing that the Sabre pilots could do unless the MiGs decided to come down and do battle. The high-flying MiGs could pick the time and place of battle, and their higher speed at high altitudes enabled them to break off combat at will when things got too tight. Many a MiG escaped destruction by being able to flee across the Yalu where the Sabres were forbidden to pursue.
The Sabre was much heavier than the MiG and had a superior diving speed. Both the MiG and the F-86 could go supersonic in a dive, but the Sabre was much more stable than the MiG in the transonic speed regime. One way for a Sabre to shake a MiG sitting on its tail was for the F-86 pilot to open his throttle all the way up and go over into a dive, pulling its pursuer down to lower altitudes where the F-86 had a performance advantage. Above Mach 0.86, the MiG-15 suffered from severe directional snaking, which made the aircraft a poor gun platform at these high speeds. Buffeting in the MiG began at Mach 0.91, and a nose-up tendency initiated at Mach 0.93. The high-speed stability problems of the MiG-15 were so severe that it was not all that uncommon for a MiG to go into the transonic regime during an air battle, only to lose its entire vertical tail assembly during violent combat maneuvering. The rate of roll of the MiG was too slow, and lateral-directional stability was poor at high altitudes and speeds.
One of the most serious weaknesses of the MiG-15 was its tendency to go into uncontrollable spins, especially in the hands of inexperienced pilots. Many Sabre victories in Korea were scored without the F-86 pilots ever having to fire their guns--they merely forced their MiG opponents into spins from which their pilots could not recover. An experienced MiG pilot could get himself out of a spin, but the aircraft was somewhat unstable and lacked good stall warning properties.
The turning radius of the MiG was good, somewhat better than that of the F-86A, E and early F. However, this advantage was largely eliminated by the advent of the "6-3" wing of the later F-86F. The good turning radius of the MiG was compromised by poor stalling characteristics. These bad stalling characteristics could get a green MiG pilot into serious trouble during the stress of a dogfight, causing his fighter to suddenly stall, go into an uncontrollable spin, and fall out of the sky.
In contrast, the spinning characteristics of the Sabre were excellent, and gave most pilots no trouble at all. If the F-86 was forced into a spin, recovery was usually effected by simply neutralizing the controls.
The MiG-15 armament of one 37-mm N-37 cannon and two 23-mm NR-23 guns was designed for attacking bombers, and was not really intended for use against fighters. Forty rounds of 37-mm ammunition and 160 rounds of 23-mm ammunition were carried, a rather low ammunition capacity. The 37-mm gun fired at a rate of 450 rpm, whereas the 23-mm guns each fired at a rate of 650 rpm. The MiG's armament had a good punch, but the rate of fire was too slow to make it effective against nimble, rapidly-maneuvering fighters. In contrast, the F-86's armament of six 0.50-in machine guns had a rapid firing rate and the aircraft carried an ample supply of ammunition. However, the machine guns of the Sabre lacked the stopping power of the MiG's cannon. It was not uncommon for a Sabre pilot to empty all 1600 rounds of his ammunition at a MiG, only to see it escape unscathed.
The gunsight of the MiG-15 was of the simple gyro type, similar to that of the early F-86A. It lacked any radar ranging capability. The radar ranging gunsight of the later Sabres made the F-86 a much more accurate gun platform than the MiG, but this accuracy was sometimes wasted because of the low weight of fire from the machine guns.
The MiG was much lighter than the Sabre, weighing only 11,070 pounds loaded. The take off run to clear a 50-foot obstacle was only 2500 feet, as compared with 3660 feet for the F-86A.
Internal fuel capacity of the MiG was 372 US gallons, compared with 435 gallons for the Sabre. This gave the MiG a range of 480 miles, which could be increased to 675 miles with drop tanks.
During the Korean War, 792 MiG-15s were destroyed by F-86 pilots, with 118 probables being claimed. 78 Sabres were definitely lost in air-to-air combat against the MiGs, with a further 13 Sabres being listed as missing in action. This is about a ten-to-one superiority. From this result, one might naturally conclude that the F-86 was the superior fighter. However, a factor which must also be considered is the relative level of experience and competence of the opposing pilots. The US Sabre pilots were all highly trained and competent airmen, many of whom had extensive World War 2 combat experience. With the exception of some Russian World War 2 veterans who flew MiG fighters in Korea, the MiG pilots were often sent into combat with only minimal flying experience. MiG pilots often exercised poor combat discipline. During the course of battle, MiG pilots would often break off into confusion and panic, firing wildly, and leaving their wingmen unprotected. Often, a MiG pilot in trouble would eject from his plane before anyone actually shot at him. Many MiG pilots were so inexperienced that in the heat of battle they would end up getting themselves into uncontrollable spins and crashing. At times, MiG pilots would fire their cannon in an attempt to lighten their loads, without really aiming at anything. Most of the MiG pilots were extremely wary of combat, and usually did not attempt to fight unless they saw an advantage opening up. In contrast, the Sabre pilots were aggressive and eager for combat, and wanted nothing more than for the MiGs to come over the Yalu so that they could add to their scores.
So, which plane would you rather be sitting in, the MiG-15 or the F-86? Perhaps Chuck Yeager said it best--"It isn't the plane that is important in combat, it's the man sitting in it."
Which was the better fighter, the Sabre or the MiG? As in most questions of this type, the answer is--it depends!
Throughout the Korean war, American intelligence on the capabilities of the MiG-15 was limited largely to Sabre pilots' fleeting impressions of the Russian-built aircraft when they encountered it in combat. These impressions were reinforced by a description of a MiG-15 flown to Denmark in March of 1953 by a Polish defector, and also by the examination of a wrecked MiG salvaged from 17 feet of water off the North Korean coast in July of 1951.
On September 21, 1953, Lt. No Kum-Suk of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Corps defected to the South along with his MiG-15bis. This presented the USAF with its first flyable example of its MiG-15 opponent, and gave US intelligence the first chance to compare its initial impressions with actual flight test data. The MiG was dismantled and flown to Okinawa aboard a C-124 Globemaster. There, it was reassembled and flown by a crew of experienced test pilots including Maj. Gen. Albert B. Boyd, Major Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager, and Capt H. E. Collins. The MiG was painted with USAF markings, and was assigned the fictitious serial number "616", because Capt. Collins had used this same number on a plane he had once flown. The actual MiG serial number was 2015357. This aircraft was later flown to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. Lt. No's MiG-15bis is currently on display at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base Museum, painted in its original North Korean markings. The test flights confirmed the initial impressions of combat pilots in Korea. The MiG-15 was faster than the F-86A and F-86E at altitudes above 30,000 feet, but slower at lower altitudes. Early F-86Fs were superior in speed to the MiG only up to 35,000 feet, whereas the "6-3" F-86Fs were faster than their MiG opponents all the way up to the Sabre's service ceiling.
One of the primary advantages of the MiG over the Sabre was its 4000-foot advantage in service ceiling. It would often happen that F-86s would enter MiG Alley at 40,000 feet, only to find MiGs circling 10,000 feet above them. There was nothing that the Sabre pilots could do unless the MiGs decided to come down and do battle. The high-flying MiGs could pick the time and place of battle, and their higher speed at high altitudes enabled them to break off combat at will when things got too tight. Many a MiG escaped destruction by being able to flee across the Yalu where the Sabres were forbidden to pursue.
The Sabre was much heavier than the MiG and had a superior diving speed. Both the MiG and the F-86 could go supersonic in a dive, but the Sabre was much more stable than the MiG in the transonic speed regime. One way for a Sabre to shake a MiG sitting on its tail was for the F-86 pilot to open his throttle all the way up and go over into a dive, pulling its pursuer down to lower altitudes where the F-86 had a performance advantage. Above Mach 0.86, the MiG-15 suffered from severe directional snaking, which made the aircraft a poor gun platform at these high speeds. Buffeting in the MiG began at Mach 0.91, and a nose-up tendency initiated at Mach 0.93. The high-speed stability problems of the MiG-15 were so severe that it was not all that uncommon for a MiG to go into the transonic regime during an air battle, only to lose its entire vertical tail assembly during violent combat maneuvering. The rate of roll of the MiG was too slow, and lateral-directional stability was poor at high altitudes and speeds.
One of the most serious weaknesses of the MiG-15 was its tendency to go into uncontrollable spins, especially in the hands of inexperienced pilots. Many Sabre victories in Korea were scored without the F-86 pilots ever having to fire their guns--they merely forced their MiG opponents into spins from which their pilots could not recover. An experienced MiG pilot could get himself out of a spin, but the aircraft was somewhat unstable and lacked good stall warning properties.
The turning radius of the MiG was good, somewhat better than that of the F-86A, E and early F. However, this advantage was largely eliminated by the advent of the "6-3" wing of the later F-86F. The good turning radius of the MiG was compromised by poor stalling characteristics. These bad stalling characteristics could get a green MiG pilot into serious trouble during the stress of a dogfight, causing his fighter to suddenly stall, go into an uncontrollable spin, and fall out of the sky.
In contrast, the spinning characteristics of the Sabre were excellent, and gave most pilots no trouble at all. If the F-86 was forced into a spin, recovery was usually effected by simply neutralizing the controls.
The MiG-15 armament of one 37-mm N-37 cannon and two 23-mm NR-23 guns was designed for attacking bombers, and was not really intended for use against fighters. Forty rounds of 37-mm ammunition and 160 rounds of 23-mm ammunition were carried, a rather low ammunition capacity. The 37-mm gun fired at a rate of 450 rpm, whereas the 23-mm guns each fired at a rate of 650 rpm. The MiG's armament had a good punch, but the rate of fire was too slow to make it effective against nimble, rapidly-maneuvering fighters. In contrast, the F-86's armament of six 0.50-in machine guns had a rapid firing rate and the aircraft carried an ample supply of ammunition. However, the machine guns of the Sabre lacked the stopping power of the MiG's cannon. It was not uncommon for a Sabre pilot to empty all 1600 rounds of his ammunition at a MiG, only to see it escape unscathed.
The gunsight of the MiG-15 was of the simple gyro type, similar to that of the early F-86A. It lacked any radar ranging capability. The radar ranging gunsight of the later Sabres made the F-86 a much more accurate gun platform than the MiG, but this accuracy was sometimes wasted because of the low weight of fire from the machine guns.
The MiG was much lighter than the Sabre, weighing only 11,070 pounds loaded. The take off run to clear a 50-foot obstacle was only 2500 feet, as compared with 3660 feet for the F-86A.
Internal fuel capacity of the MiG was 372 US gallons, compared with 435 gallons for the Sabre. This gave the MiG a range of 480 miles, which could be increased to 675 miles with drop tanks.
During the Korean War, 792 MiG-15s were destroyed by F-86 pilots, with 118 probables being claimed. 78 Sabres were definitely lost in air-to-air combat against the MiGs, with a further 13 Sabres being listed as missing in action. This is about a ten-to-one superiority. From this result, one might naturally conclude that the F-86 was the superior fighter. However, a factor which must also be considered is the relative level of experience and competence of the opposing pilots. The US Sabre pilots were all highly trained and competent airmen, many of whom had extensive World War 2 combat experience. With the exception of some Russian World War 2 veterans who flew MiG fighters in Korea, the MiG pilots were often sent into combat with only minimal flying experience. MiG pilots often exercised poor combat discipline. During the course of battle, MiG pilots would often break off into confusion and panic, firing wildly, and leaving their wingmen unprotected. Often, a MiG pilot in trouble would eject from his plane before anyone actually shot at him. Many MiG pilots were so inexperienced that in the heat of battle they would end up getting themselves into uncontrollable spins and crashing. At times, MiG pilots would fire their cannon in an attempt to lighten their loads, without really aiming at anything. Most of the MiG pilots were extremely wary of combat, and usually did not attempt to fight unless they saw an advantage opening up. In contrast, the Sabre pilots were aggressive and eager for combat, and wanted nothing more than for the MiGs to come over the Yalu so that they could add to their scores.
So, which plane would you rather be sitting in, the MiG-15 or the F-86? Perhaps Chuck Yeager said it best--"It isn't the plane that is important in combat, it's the man sitting in it."
Study of Captured F86 by Soviet Colonel Evgueni Pepeliaev
http://www.fr.rian.ru/analysis/20070615/67300859.html
It was at the beginning of the years 1950, in the Korean sky, when the Soviet and American pilots became for the first time of the adversaries. "In the absolute secrecy we were dispatched in Korea, country in full war at the time, remembers Evgueni Pepeliaev. - We engaged in the operations on April 1, 1951. I ordered the 196e regiment of hunting. At the time, the Americans entirely controlled the sky. Even their bombers did not fear to operate day. Before our arrival, the American pilots drove out not only vehicles on the roads but also civil, Korean the and Chinese ones, while drawing on them. Two months afterwards, we put a term at their superiority. Their bombers stopped flying in full day. The Americans started to equip their units by the very recent hunter F-86 Sabre. We flew on the Mig. From the point of view of the performances, the two apparatuses were almost with equality, but each one had, obviously, its advantages. The Mig was higher in the vertical combat, thanks to a higher ceiling. The American hunter, thanks to a better aerodynamics, was more maneuverable horizontally. The difference in maximum speeds was negligible. The Mig had a superiority crushing in fire power on any American hunter of the time. The Sabre had very poor weapons compared to the Mig, but its automatic sight was without equal. The Mig exceeded also the American hunter of viability. I remember that pilots were posed while returning of missions with forty holes in their apparatuses! With two recoveries, my plane was touched. The pilots of my regiment achieved nearly 4.000 missions on the whole. With their credit, 108 enemy planes cut down. Our losses amounted to 10 Mig Four of my pilots died, six succeeded in being ejected. In other words, my 196e regiment, in the aerial combats with the US Air Force, had a score of victories from 1 to 10 in our favour. Usually, between twelve and thirty-five Soviet hunters took share with the aerial combats against Sabres. The Americans made a point of restoring their air superiority. But, reacting painfully to the losses, they often gave up the combat. My notebook contains notes on 108 missions and 39 aerial combats. On the whole, I cut down 23 planes. With their number, two F-94 Starfire, F-80 Shooting Star, F-84 Thunderjet, and the remainder it was of F-86 Sabre. All these planes belonged to the US Air Force. Very fighter pilot keeps in general in his memory the engagements where it failed to be cut down itself. A combat is held at very high speeds and with colossal overloads, the pilots suffer from sight trouble and lose consciousness from it. It is once on the ground which one remembers certain episodes of an air duel. It was one morning of July 1951. Eight reconnaissance aircraft F-94 regained their aerodrome in two four, at an altitude of 8.000 meters. We fell apart and, of start, after a turn of combat, we engaged a bringing together. I caught up with them 4 minutes after the take-off, making the decision to attack with a group of four planes under my orders the four F-94 of behind. To the commander of the second flotilla, I gave the order to attack the four of front. I saw my shells well reaching the belly of F-94, fragments of his coating to be detached one after the other in the explosions. Another F-94 which flew on my left, entered a deep spiral. I continued it. I remember very well that in spiral, to a distance of 100 meters or even slightly more, I sent an average gust to him, so as to tear off his tail. At full speed, I entered remains. Fortunately that I lowered the head, they did not touch me. By way of proof of our victories, one brought on the aerodrome of the elements of the planes which we cut down. This empennage of F-94 was also deposited to him. I remember to have cut down on October 6, 1951 a Sabre which had thereafter to be posed urgently on the territory of the North Korea. I practised a maneuver diversion which I had worked out well in times of peace. It always made a success of me. In course of collision, I showed with the adversary that I engaged a turn of upward combat on the left, but actually I left on the right. Thus, after a turn, F-86 was found opposite me, at a distance from 80 to 100 meters. After my maneuvre, I saw the Sabre in my collimator. I sent a gust in his direction. I saw one of my shells immediately touching the plane behind the canopy of the cabin. The plane fell but the pilot knew to pose it on a bank. This Sabre was led on our aerodrome from where it was sent in Moscow. My pilots and me we could go up in his cabin which had remained intact. This Sabre rendered a great service to us. The Americans had air ventilated suits which enabled them to support the overloads much more easily and to be tired. At the time, we did not have such clothing yet, on the other hand, those of the trophies already did not miss. But we did not have the governor automatically-controlled which had remained on the cut down aircraft. "My" Sabre had a perfect gyroscopic horizon. The Mig at the time were equipped with a bad apparatus. To the pilot, it did not make it possible to make a band of more than 40°. There was indeed evil to be directed, by forming large angles of rise and descent. As for our engineers, this Sabre their provided matter to reflexion. On the Mig, there was already a normal gyroscopic horizon and a good sight. The study of the engine of the Sabre was also great utility. Colonel Evgueni Pepeliaev, Hero of the Soviet Union, 89 years, lives in Moscow. He is known as the author of a book with success, "the Mig ones against the Sabres", on the air war in Korea (1950-1953). Remarks collected by Iouri Ploutenko
It was at the beginning of the years 1950, in the Korean sky, when the Soviet and American pilots became for the first time of the adversaries. "In the absolute secrecy we were dispatched in Korea, country in full war at the time, remembers Evgueni Pepeliaev. - We engaged in the operations on April 1, 1951. I ordered the 196e regiment of hunting. At the time, the Americans entirely controlled the sky. Even their bombers did not fear to operate day. Before our arrival, the American pilots drove out not only vehicles on the roads but also civil, Korean the and Chinese ones, while drawing on them. Two months afterwards, we put a term at their superiority. Their bombers stopped flying in full day. The Americans started to equip their units by the very recent hunter F-86 Sabre. We flew on the Mig. From the point of view of the performances, the two apparatuses were almost with equality, but each one had, obviously, its advantages. The Mig was higher in the vertical combat, thanks to a higher ceiling. The American hunter, thanks to a better aerodynamics, was more maneuverable horizontally. The difference in maximum speeds was negligible. The Mig had a superiority crushing in fire power on any American hunter of the time. The Sabre had very poor weapons compared to the Mig, but its automatic sight was without equal. The Mig exceeded also the American hunter of viability. I remember that pilots were posed while returning of missions with forty holes in their apparatuses! With two recoveries, my plane was touched. The pilots of my regiment achieved nearly 4.000 missions on the whole. With their credit, 108 enemy planes cut down. Our losses amounted to 10 Mig Four of my pilots died, six succeeded in being ejected. In other words, my 196e regiment, in the aerial combats with the US Air Force, had a score of victories from 1 to 10 in our favour. Usually, between twelve and thirty-five Soviet hunters took share with the aerial combats against Sabres. The Americans made a point of restoring their air superiority. But, reacting painfully to the losses, they often gave up the combat. My notebook contains notes on 108 missions and 39 aerial combats. On the whole, I cut down 23 planes. With their number, two F-94 Starfire, F-80 Shooting Star, F-84 Thunderjet, and the remainder it was of F-86 Sabre. All these planes belonged to the US Air Force. Very fighter pilot keeps in general in his memory the engagements where it failed to be cut down itself. A combat is held at very high speeds and with colossal overloads, the pilots suffer from sight trouble and lose consciousness from it. It is once on the ground which one remembers certain episodes of an air duel. It was one morning of July 1951. Eight reconnaissance aircraft F-94 regained their aerodrome in two four, at an altitude of 8.000 meters. We fell apart and, of start, after a turn of combat, we engaged a bringing together. I caught up with them 4 minutes after the take-off, making the decision to attack with a group of four planes under my orders the four F-94 of behind. To the commander of the second flotilla, I gave the order to attack the four of front. I saw my shells well reaching the belly of F-94, fragments of his coating to be detached one after the other in the explosions. Another F-94 which flew on my left, entered a deep spiral. I continued it. I remember very well that in spiral, to a distance of 100 meters or even slightly more, I sent an average gust to him, so as to tear off his tail. At full speed, I entered remains. Fortunately that I lowered the head, they did not touch me. By way of proof of our victories, one brought on the aerodrome of the elements of the planes which we cut down. This empennage of F-94 was also deposited to him. I remember to have cut down on October 6, 1951 a Sabre which had thereafter to be posed urgently on the territory of the North Korea. I practised a maneuver diversion which I had worked out well in times of peace. It always made a success of me. In course of collision, I showed with the adversary that I engaged a turn of upward combat on the left, but actually I left on the right. Thus, after a turn, F-86 was found opposite me, at a distance from 80 to 100 meters. After my maneuvre, I saw the Sabre in my collimator. I sent a gust in his direction. I saw one of my shells immediately touching the plane behind the canopy of the cabin. The plane fell but the pilot knew to pose it on a bank. This Sabre was led on our aerodrome from where it was sent in Moscow. My pilots and me we could go up in his cabin which had remained intact. This Sabre rendered a great service to us. The Americans had air ventilated suits which enabled them to support the overloads much more easily and to be tired. At the time, we did not have such clothing yet, on the other hand, those of the trophies already did not miss. But we did not have the governor automatically-controlled which had remained on the cut down aircraft. "My" Sabre had a perfect gyroscopic horizon. The Mig at the time were equipped with a bad apparatus. To the pilot, it did not make it possible to make a band of more than 40°. There was indeed evil to be directed, by forming large angles of rise and descent. As for our engineers, this Sabre their provided matter to reflexion. On the Mig, there was already a normal gyroscopic horizon and a good sight. The study of the engine of the Sabre was also great utility. Colonel Evgueni Pepeliaev, Hero of the Soviet Union, 89 years, lives in Moscow. He is known as the author of a book with success, "the Mig ones against the Sabres", on the air war in Korea (1950-1953). Remarks collected by Iouri Ploutenko
Wednesday, 26 September 2007
Battle of MiG 15
While the MiG-15 has publicly shown in 1949. (in particular, participated in the air parade in July 1949 in Tushino), its high performance and use in large quantities in
"MIG" somewhat less than the F-86 aircraft in a horizontal manoeuvrability (due to the use of F-86 predkrylkov) in the range of from PTB. In the air war over
F-94. At Pepelyaeva by 12 F-86, F-84, four, six F-80, one F-94. N. Sutyagin won a victory in 1921 with 150 sorties, and 15 aircraft destroyed by Shchukin and
The totals also spoken in favour of Russian military equipment. Soviet pilots, according to the city Lobov, in the air battle over
Abroad, there are different estimates of the impact of MiG-15 and F-86 in
Without going into the debate so strained explanation, noting that the figures clearly untrue. 'll Use also that the Soviet aviation main task was to cover
MiG-15 is widely used in 1956 в during the fighting between Egypt and the coalition, formed by Israel, Britain and France. Park fighters MiG-15 bis, who represented the Egyptian Air Force base, there were cars on the Soviet and Czechoslovak production (ie, 41% of the 270 combat aircraft available to
Tuesday, 18 September 2007
MiG-15 and F-86 Sabre Arm
Sabre Arming MiG-15 and F-86 Sabre
F-86 armed with a 12.7 mm machine guns family.
Arming MiG-15 were three guns: one fire 37 mm and two 23 mm and a weight seconds bursts MiG-15 significantly exceeded F-86.
As evidenced by our pilots fighting in Korea [11], arming MiG-15 related to its main advantages
For example, getting a 37-mm shells at the enemy fighter shooting down his guarantee, while documented cases of MiG-15 returned to the airfield with more than a hundred (!) Proboin Seybra of machine guns.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)